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Musical Form as a Complex
of Virtual Problematic Fields and Processes of Actualization:
Emergent Teleologies in Beethoven's *Kreutzer* Sonata, Op. 47 (1803)

Abstract. Music being an art of time, reflections on musical form naturally lead composers and theorists to think in teleological terms, where the musical discourse is articulated upon more or less straightforward goal-oriented processes. Yet, teleology is also a concept rooted in philosophy where Finalist and Mechanist views oppose each other. If the former casts *telos* as *raison d'être*, posing a predefined final cause to the state-of-things, the latter rather implies a causal chain the outcome of which is entirely predetermined by natural laws, failing to recognize, in both cases, teleology's inherent creative dynamic. By contrast, in his *Difference and Repetition* (1968), Gilles Deleuze develops a materialist ontology articulated upon the concepts of virtual and actual where the virtual is a problematic field structured by forces and intensities determining the actualization of individuated singularities, in an outright critique of the Platonist model where the Real conforms more or less reliably to pre-existing ideal essences. In this paper, we first reflect upon how this ontology can bring a renewed appreciation of teleology, asking whether virtual and actual can be related in any teleological way, and further, how this relation can shed new light on musical form. Taking ground on the morphogenesis and ontogenesis acting at the level of the individuation process from virtual to actual, Deleuze's concept of *static genesis* will be revisited through the speculative idea of *static teleology*, and musical form will thus be explored as complex of virtual problematic fields. These perspectives on teleology and form will be illustrated by analyses of Beethoven's Sonata for violin and piano, No. 9, Op. 47 (1803), also known as the Kreutzer Sonata.

Keywords: musical teleology, linear time, musical form, Beethoven, Kreutzer Sonata for violin and piano, No. 9, Op. 47, Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, ontology, virtual, actual, intensive, philosophy of difference.

As temporal art, music is naturally concerned with directionality, setting goals and expectations, resolutions and deferrals, deviating strategies or means of relentlessly heading *towards*, or simply moving *forwards*. Musical teleology embraces such considerations, but teleology as a philosophical concept—between Finalism and Mechanism—not only casts *telos* as a goal but also as *raison d'être*, which may not successfully account for its inherent creative dynamic. In this paper, we first reflect upon how the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, with its ontology of virtual and actual, can bring a renewed appreciation of teleology, asking whether virtual and actual can be related in any teleological way, and further, how this relation can inform our view on musical form. We first investigate the morphogenetic—or *horizontal*—implications of these ideas in relation to Jonathan Kramer's notion of linear time. Secondly, we study the *static genesis*—occurring *vertically*—between the virtual and the actual through the speculative idea of *static teleology*, and by approaching musical form as a complex of virtual problematic fields. These perspectives on teleology and form will be explored by analyses of Beethoven's Sonata for violin and piano No. 9, Op. 47 (1803), also known as the Kreutzer Sonata.[1]

Deleuze's virtual, actual and intensive

In his seminal book *Difference and Repetition* (1968), Deleuze develops a materialist ontology articulated upon the concepts of virtual and actual. The virtual, opposed to the relationship between Platonist essence and its copies (casting a transcendent realm of existence), is as real as its actual counterpart but is rather to be seen as *incorporeal* (Deleuze 1993/1969) or transcendental (and thus fully immanent). The virtual is posited as an ideal structure (*structure idéelle*) of differential elements and relationships, a multiplicity of pre-individual singularities constituting, following Simondon (cf. Simondon 1964), a problematic field of individuation fostering the actualization of state-of-things that, as opposed to more or less bad Platonist copies, do not resemble the problems they solve. *Difference* is the fundamental principle upon which this system relies, and it follows that intensity, as difference,[2] constitutes the connecting element between virtual

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[1] Our focus on the classical paradigm may seem at odds with Deleuze's well known interest in contemporary art: from Artaud's poetry to Bacon's painting, concepts such as "body-without-organs" or "preindividual singularities" easily find resonance. Yet, it's also undeniable that ontologically speaking, any state-of-thing has both individual and pre-individual implications. Thus, discussing the virtual and actual in relation to a more conventional form of expression may tentatively demonstrate that there is no such thing as "Deleuzian music" (cf. Gallope's "Is There a Deleuzian Musical Work?", 2008), but rather *Deleuzian ways* of appreciating it.

[2] "The expression 'difference of intensity' is a tautology. Intensity is the form of difference in so far as this is the reason of the sensible. Every intensity is differential, by itself a difference. … Disparity—in other words, difference or intensity (difference of intensity)—is the sufficient reason of all phenomena, the condition of that which appears" (Deleuze 1994/1968: 222/287).

and actual.[3] Indeed, intensity drives individuation[4]: first as the metaphysical expression of difference in the virtual, where pre-individual singularities result from the reciprocal determination of differential elements in the structure,[5] and secondly, intensity constitutes the first factor of actualization of the virtual under the form of actual, yet informal, fluxes of matter and energy, such as found in the egg cytoplasm.[6] Deleuze calls such intensive processes *spatio-temporal dramatizations*: "Ideal intensities of relations are expressed in actual dynamic changes. The ideal intensive field is dramatized in an individuation" (Williams 2003: 205), and cascadingly "stratifies" into the form of a given organism.

Thus, if Deleuze embraces Simondon's scientific model as applied to biology, it is also in transcendental terms that he maps this individuation process on the virtual and actual.[7] The virtual is transcendentally pre-individual, it (onto)logically precedes the actual, whereas in Simondon, the problematic field of individuation is made of actual intensive relations of "disparation" to be resolved, and as such, *chronologically* precedes the actual individual. In other words, for Deleuze, everything in the world results from Simondonian morphogenetic processes,[8] but this also serves as an epistemological model[9] from which the transcendental conditions of real (as opposed to possible) experience can be devised.[10]

That the virtual logically precedes the actual is what can be deduced from Deleuze's ontological chain going from *differen-t-iation* (determination of the virtual) to *differen-c-iation* (individuation of actual things), where the virtual is made of pre-individual singularities (it is *differen-t-iated*), allowing for actual individuals to be *differen-c-iated*, with intensity as virtually *implicated* and actually *explicated*. Paradoxically it is upon effectuation that the actual is virtually counter-effectuated, a wording that rather suggests that the virtual comes second.[11] Yet, that the virtual appears as implicated or enveloped within the ontological depth of the actual does not threaten the idea that the implied virtual constitutes the transcendental conditions of the actual, for it is at the same time that effectuation and counter-effectuation occur: virtual and actual are two perspectives on the same *Event*.[12] Finally, it now should be clear that through differen-t/c-iation, the actual does not reproduce or represent a predefined entity. Rather it is the product of difference; it solves a problem and is pure and immanent creation.

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[3]   "It is as though everything has two odd, dissymmetrical and dissimilar 'halves' …: an ideal half submerged in the virtual and constituted on the one hand by differential relations and on the other by corresponding singularities; an actual half constituted on the one hand by the qualities actualising those relations and on the other by the parts actualising those singularities. Individuation ensures the embedding of the two dissimilar halves" (Ibid.: 279/358).

[4]   "The essential process of intensive quantities is individuation. Intensity is individuating, and intensive quantities are individuating factors" (Ibid.: 246/317).

[5]   "An Idea … is neither one nor multiple, but a multiplicity constituted of differential elements, differential relations between those elements, and singularities corresponding to those relations. These three dimensions, elements, relations and singularities, constitute the three aspects of multiple reason: determinability or the principle of quantitability, reciprocal determination or the principle of qualitability, and complete determination or the principle of potentiality" (Ibid.: 278/356).

[6]   "How does actualisation occur in things themselves? … Beneath the actual qualities and extensities, species and parts, there are spatio-temporal dynamisms. These are the actualising, differentiating agencies. … A whole kinematics of the egg appears, which implies a dynamic. Moreover, this dynamic expresses something ideal. … Types of egg are therefore distinguished by the orientations, the axes of development, the differential speeds and rhythms which are the primary factors in the actualisation of a structure and create a space and a time peculiar to that which is actualised" (Ibid.: 214/276).

[7]   "However, energy in general or intensive quantity is the *spatium*, the theatre of all metamorphosis or difference in itself which envelops all its degrees in the production of each. In this sense, energy or intensive quantity is a transcendental principle, not a scientific concept" (Deleuze 1994/1968: 240/310, original emphasis). For further discussion on the much-debated status of the Intensive in Deleuze's ontology, see Bowden and Clisby: "commentators appear to be divided as to whether the Intensive is virtual in nature, actual in nature, or whether it constitutes a third ontological realm" (Bowden and Clisby 2017: 154).

[8]   "Every diversity and every change refer to a difference which is its sufficient reason. Everything which happens and everything which appears is correlated with orders of differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, *difference of intensity*" (Deleuze 1994/1968: 222/286, original emphasis).

[9]   "The world is an egg. Moreover, the egg, in effect, provides us with a model for the order of reasons: … differentiation-individuation-dramatisation-differenciation" (Ibid.: 251/323).

[10]   Ibid.: 69/95.

[11]   That the virtual corresponds to the counter-effectuation of the actual is a wording that is to be found more extensively in *Logic of Sense* (Deleuze 1993/1969).

[12]   "In this sense, it is correct to represent a double series of events which develop on two planes, echoing without resembling each other: real events on the level of the engendered solutions, and ideal events embedded in the conditions of the problem" (Deleuze 1994/1968: 188/244).

Deleuze, Kramer and emergent teleologies

Musical teleology is often broadly defined as *goal-orientedness*. In Aristotelian thinking, *telos* concerns a thing's final cause, its purpose: the telos of the seed is to grow into a tree. Although this finalist view has always been a matter of debate, namely as opposed to mechanist conceptions where the efficient cause constitutes a sufficient reason in itself, the idea of *aiming towards* permeates most aspects of our life. The question as to what form teleology can take in music, and which of the finalist or mechanist views is more suitable to account for its fundamental logic remains elusive, namely whether expectations can be intrinsically determined by the music itself, or if external factors such as learned experience are necessary to their functioning. For the purpose of our discussion, we assume that music has both the capacity to set up expectations for goals to be reached and to purposefully avoid doing so and that learned experience simply reinforces either feature. Fostering expectations thus places us in a finalist mindset where a predefined goal seems both to pre-exist its realization and to motivate and eventually subsume what leads to it. Alternatively, in a mechanist framework, the music flows forward according to inherent rules without arousing definite expectations.

In Jonathan Kramer's *The Time of Music* (1988), musical time results from various levels of interactions between linearity and nonlinearity. Linearity consists of "the determination of some characteristic(s) of music in accordance with implications that arise from earlier events of the piece. … Nonlinearity, on the other hand …, is the "determination of some characteristic(s) of music in accordance with implications that arise from principles or tendencies governing an entire piece or section" (Kramer 1988: 20). Certain compositions emphasize linearity as in tonal music ("the quintessential expression of linearity") (Ibid.: 23), while others have no apparent linear implications, thus highlighting their nonlinear dimension as in music entirely governed by serial thinking, or further in what Kramer terms (after Stockhausen) "moment time". To him, sonata form embodies at its *best-directed linearity*, where the form consists in challenging tonic stability by exploring more or less distant tonal areas, such that listeners feel the necessity of its return, understood and felt like a significant resolution. Moreover, the return to the tonic is most often doubled by a return of the main theme, thus creating the so-called "double–return", which constitutes the main structural goal of the work. All this adequately describes the model to which the Kreutzer Sonata conforms splendidly (Fig. 1).

Slow introduction		1-18	A maj. > min.
Exposition	**MT**	19-44	A min.
	Transition	45-90	… "V of E"
	ST1	91-143	E maj. > min.
	ST2	144-193	E min. > A min.
Development	**Core 1**	194-257	F maj. > min.
	Core 2	258-343	D^b maj. > F min. > (A)
Recapitulation	**MT**	344-365	A min.
	Transition	366-411	… "V of A"
	ST1	412-464	A maj. > min.
	ST2	465-509	A min.
Coda		510-599	A min.

Figure 1. Beethoven, Kreutzer Sonata: Formal plan

Nondirected linearity also gives a sense of being in motion, as with tonal music, but the idea of a specific goal remains equivocal since a clear sense of expectation is purposely avoided. Kramer: "we do not really know where we are going … until we get there" (Ibid.: 40). György Ligeti's *Lux Aeterna* (1966) illustrates this very well, for example, when the micro-polyphonic texture, developing as a growing diatonic cluster, reaches a point where only one pitch–class octave remains (Fig. 2). Unlike common tonal practice, nothing helps a listener in anticipating this *goal* in particular, although a sense of orientedness is provided in terms of harmonic direction and density, starting from a single pitch (F), and later settling upon a new pitch center (A) in octave.[13]

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[13]   It could be argued that this process (unison–cluster–octave) reproduces the basic *stability–tension–resolution* schema found in tonal music, and that as such, rather enacting directed linearity. Against this view, our claim is that the degree of harmonico-syntactic articulation is a decisive factor in defining a specific goal to be reached. The Ligeti example represents a largely organic fabric that relegates to macroscopic parameters, such as density or register, the function of fostering directionality, in such a way that it is only upon completion of a process that we know that 'this was the goal', whereas in tonal music, we do not feel completion until tonic arrival. In other words, Ligeti's octave is not *necessarily* implied as a goal, whereas the tonic is necessary to tonal completion.

Figure 2. György Ligeti, *Lux Aeterna*: General harmonic outline of bar 1–37
(after Jarvlepp 1981–1982)

Kramer's categories of linear time thus satisfyingly account for our two main teleological types: directed linearity entails finalist implications, and non-directed linearity enacts a mechanist functioning. With the former, every event is understood as oriented toward a goal (*telos*) in the sense of both finality (provided by expectation) and actual destination to be reached, while with the latter, every event is determined by inherent rules, and their succession draws a certain trajectory, but in a continuational rather than dialectical way ("Such music carries us along its continuum") (Kramer 1988: 40). However, in what way can we relate goal and process? What makes a goal resolutive in nature? Perceptual factors such as harmonic dissonance and consonance surely participate, but hardly more than as contextual supportive means, and cannot account for the deeper teleological implications in play (e.g. if tonal music associates 'goal' with 'greater consonance', Gérard Grisey's *Partiels* reverses this by proceeding from harmonicity to inharmonicity).

According to Deleuze, the virtual determines times of actualization. The virtual—as the structure of differential elements, relations and singularities—not only determines what the actual *is* in its current state but also the intensive processes that gave rise to it.[14] As an example, a human organ is not the realization of an ideal essence, but the actualization of a system of relations and singularities that progressively determined its growth from the most primary intensive movements of formless matter. This is not to say, for example, that the virtual of an embryo is already foreshadowing that of an adult, which would mean that the virtual exists outside the actual. Rather, each moment of the morphogenetic process is fully actual, implying its corresponding virtual both in constant becoming, and dynamic reciprocal determination; the individuation process follows its course, step by step.[15] It follows then that we can understand the teleology of this system in two ways: first, the morphogenetic process is teleological in a mechanist sense; it goes forward without having a predefined goal. Second, a teleological process as static genesis, or *static teleology*, emerges between the actual state-of-thing and its virtual implications, reversing the sense of implication: not only is the goal implied (as expected), but also all that leads to it that is implied in its intensive depth.[16]

In this view, the teleological process is not a fixed path to be followed with a known reachable goal, nor a fully predetermined causal chain. Rather it is a continuously redefined, pure creation, pure becoming, which is akin to our experience of the musical form: at any moment of the unfolding of form, our understanding of processes and their constituents are in constant redefinition. It is only when a cell, motive or theme is segregated from other units in the musical flow that we consider its virtual structure and implied times of actualization to be completed. Even a partial theme or motive can be construed as an actual—however well-formed state-of-thing, with its virtual implications, akin to Deleuze's *larval subject* (e.g. embryo). That a goal is expected from earlier implications in the music does not make it pre-existing (as a Platonist ideal essence waiting to be realized, or as an Aristotelian final cause[17]), which can be illustrated by the way composers set

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[14] "On the other hand, the dynamisms … constitute a time of actualisation or differenciation no less than they outline spaces of actualisation. Not only do these spaces begin to incarnate differential relations between elements of the reciprocally and completely determined structure, but the times of differenciation incarnate the time of the structure, the time of progressive determination. … Finally, beneath species and parts, we find only these times, these rates of growth, these paces of development, these decelerations or accelerations, these durations of gestation" (Deleuze 1994/1968: 217/280).

[15] "It is indeed true that differenciation is progressive and serial [*cascadante*]: the characteristics of the major types appear before those of genus and species in the order of the determination of species; and in the order of organisation, this shoot is the beginning of a paw before it becomes a right or left paw" (Ibid.: 215/277).

[16] "It is sufficient to understand that the genesis takes place … between the virtual and its actualisation - in other words, it goes from the structure to its incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the cases of solution, from the differential elements and their ideal connections to actual terms and diverse real relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time. This is a genesis without dynamism, evolving necessarily in the element of a supra-historicity, a *static genesis*" (Ibid.: 183/238).

[17] It is true that composers have (most often) a precise idea of the destination of the music they are composing, which has been notably demonstrated in the case of Beethoven ("Again, it attests to the remarkable consistency with which Beethoven is concerned with establishing a destination to which his initial ideas will lead," cf. Ahn 1997: 66), and once such an ending has been devised, it may be said to pre-exist what will precedes it, as if the solution pre-existed its "problem". Yet, we can easily imagine

up expectations *in order* to surprise us—thus exploring various potential goals to the same process, just as in the Kreutzer Sonata where unconventional interruptions affect not only the expected musical flow but also our appreciation of musical units in the larger formal context. This happens, for instance, when the main theme presentation leads to a short pause on the relative major (C), breaking the continuity of what should otherwise be understood as a sentence structure (mm. 19–44). The irregular construction of the presentation, itself sentential in design, participates in the equivocation of the fermata on the mediant as ending or not, providing a momentary sense of completion.

Another significant deviation occurs in ST1 (starting m. 91) when what first appears as a varied periodic model (the consequent turns in minor) is retrospectively reinterpreted as a compound sentence of a much wider scope (cf. Schmalfeldt 2011: 100–101). This is done by truncating the consequent continuation and by pausing (fermata, m. 116) on a dominant of III, and then abruptly shifting to a continuation of a very contrasting character (m. 117). The development also presents surprising turns, notably when the expected standing on the dominant in the home key (m. 300), signalling a conventional and imminent "double–return", is immediately repeated as dominant of D minor (m. 314), leading to a fermata on IV (m. 324), which melodically and harmonically sounds like a false start of the main theme before its actual false recapitulation (m. 326). This adequately prepares for the return of D minor as IV on the MT downbeat in the home key (m. 344). To be sure, such playing with expectations is the bread and butter of most music-making and necessarily implies interplay with stylistic conventions. But what it shows, in turn, is that many solutions exist for the same musical problem, each exploring a different potential of the musical drama that is set up and continuously redefined in a constant *process of becoming*.[18] Cells, motives, themes, sections and the piece as a whole thus appear as various levels of actualization—emergent teleologies, continuously evolving through retrospective reinterpretation, smaller-scale actualizations being seen as local integrations in a larger and global process of actualization, the virtual of which encompasses all the others, thus constituting a genuine multiplicity of multiplicities.[19]

Teleology thus defined bridges together Kramer's directed and non-directed linearity by recognizing their *orientedness* while reinvigorating *goal* with a renewed sense of creativity: the goal is *resolutive*, even when not corresponding to our expectation, it brings a process to a potential close, a potential that goes beyond what will be explored in the work itself, and it is *generative* in the building up of directionality through expectation, which directly affects our experience of actualized goals.[20]

Further, in addition to teleology as goal-orientedness (finalist) and teleology 'without a telos' (mechanist), *static teleology* qualifies the relationship between virtual and actual. As a problematic field, the virtual is implicated in the actual, but it is by *ontogenetic* necessity that the actual is a solution to the virtual. In this (vitalist?[21]) logic where *telos* = x, teleology turns into a problem-solving process, as opposed to the continuous reification of predefined goals. An emphasis is thus put on the potentialities (as opposed to *possibilities*) of the virtual, the inherent openness of the problem-solving dynamic where the goal is a creative solution to a problematic

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that the draft of an ending goes under more or less significant changes upon realization of what leads to it, and so on, along the compositional process, which considerably diminishes the integrity of such "final cause". However, in the scope of this paper, we limit our discussion on musical form as experienced from the listener's perspective.

[18] In her *In the Process of Becoming* (2011), Schmalfeldt develops this concept around the idea of retrospective functional interpretation (cf. p. 9).

[19] "In this sense, by virtue of this progressivity, every structure has a purely logical, ideal or dialectical time. However, this virtual time itself determines a time of differenciation, or rather rhythms or different times of actualisation which correspond to the relations and singularities of the structure and, for their part, measure the passage from virtual to actual. In this regard, four terms are synonymous: actualise, differenciate, integrate and solve. ... Each differenciation is a local integration or a local solution which then connects with others in the overall solution or the global integration" (Deleuze 1994/1968: 210/272).

[20] See also: "We say that the leading tone "resolves" to tonic. This resolution solves the problem the leading tone (together with the tonic) has created. ... Of course, we can ... anticipate the next move. And to do so is often a habit of engaged listening and playing. But even if the next move is the one we might predict ..., the full, unfathomable potential of the situation necessarily comes into play (even in our decision to predict) in the creation of a new event with all its actual intricacy. Moreover, the always concomitant potential for other progressions necessarily leaves things open (even in our 'predicting')" (Hasty 2010: 12).

[21] As when Deleuze reads Bergson: "The Whole must *create* the divergent lines according to which it is actualized and the dissimilar means it utilizes on each line. There is finality because life does not operate without directions; but there is no 'goal', because these directions do no pre-exist ready-made, and are themselves created 'along with' the act that runs through them" (Deleuze: 1991/1966: 106/111).

field of forces.[22] In such a view, musical form becomes the teleological theater of cascading problem-solving processes doubled by the static teleology of their genetic virtuality.

Musical form as a complex of virtual problematic fields

According to Arnold Whittall, form is the "constructive or organizing element in music", and it "might be defined simply as what forms have in common" (Whittall 2001: 1) while implying an "infinite flexibility of the relation between 'form' as a generic category (such as ternary, canon, sonata) and the musical work as the unique result of the deployment of particular materials and processes."[23] Further, since early treatises on the musical form were initially oriented toward pedagogical purposes, the quest for common denominators among existing works was all the more natural. Even when a purely musicological paradigm started to develop, Whittall observes, "theorizing became more systematic, and writing about music both critically and historically more formulaic, categorizations of various kinds gained the upper hand, until, as Dahlhaus observed, 'the theory of form was a description of genres'" (Whittall 2001: 2). Following this tendency well into the 20th century, Dahlhaus' notion of an 'ideal type' illustrates a Platonist paradigm that still tends to make us look at individual works as more or less faithful instances of given abstracted forms.[24]

Sonata form (as we call it today) had played a prominent role in instrumental music since at least the 1760s, but without having been fully expressed in theoretical writings until the early 1790s, namely in the second and third volumes of Heinrich Christoph Koch's *Versuch einer Anleitenung zur Composition* (1782–1793) (cf. Bonds 1991: 2). According to such 18th-century accounts, the Sonata principle is mostly expressed in harmonic terms, such as in Leonard Ratner's model (Ratner 1980: 218, cited in Bonds 1991: 31):

$$|{:} \quad \text{I (or i)} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{V (or III)} \quad {:}|{:} \quad \text{X} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{I} \ {:}|$$

Tonic Major	→	Dominant		Unstable	→	Tonic
	or			(non-tonic)		
Tonic Minor	→	Relative Major				

Figure 3. Leonard Ratner's schema of sonata form

As Bonds confirms, "[w]ithin this construct, the number, character, and placement of thematic ideas can vary widely" (Bonds 1991: 31), whereas later 19th-century accounts of sonata form (Czerny, Marx), rather posit that "the contrast of themes within a movement plays an important structural role" (Ibid.: 33). Fundamental to this model is also the rhetorical substratum according to which a hierarchy is established between main and secondary ideas (derivative and/or contrasting), with appropriate tonal distributions, in such a way that the secondary elements should challenge their main counterpart, thus reinforcing the prevalence and meaning of the latter (Ibid.: 76–80). Beethoven's Kreutzer Sonata diligently conforms to such criteria of thematic and harmonic relationships, but also through the rigorous motivic *elaboration*[25] of the main theme germinal semitone (ic1) from which most of the material seems to be derived. A quick look at the main and subordinate thematic units illustrates this point (cf. Fig. 4).

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[22]   "The virtual possesses the reality of a task to be performed or a problem to be solved: it is the problem which orientates, conditions and engenders solutions, but these do not resemble the conditions of the problem. … Difference and repetition in the virtual ground the movement of actualisation, of differenciation as creation. They are thereby substituted for the identity and the resemblance of the possible, which inspires only a pseudo-movement, the false movement of realisation understood as abstract limitation" (Deleuze 1994/1968: 212/274).

[23]   Ibid. Also, as Mark Evan Bonds reports in his *Wordless Rhetoric*, music theorists in the 18th and 19th centuries addressed this tension between what he terms *inner* and *outer* form, where uniqueness and originality were of the highest value, while conformity to conventional practice facilitated communicability.

[24]   For instance, when Dahlhaus sees as "problematic" certain elements in the finale of Schubert's *C-Minor* Piano Sonata design, differing in some respects from Beethoven's formal procedures, thus showing that "His point of reference is an 'ideal type' of sonata form defined in terms of Beethoven" (Gossett 1989: 54, referring to Dahlhaus: 1983/1970).

[25]   Ibid. 'Elaboration' is Koch's term for what we now call motivic development or derivation (see more on Koch's theory of composition in Sisman 1982).

Figure 4. Elaboration from the a) main theme cell a (ic1) in b) ST1 and c) ST2

We can relate the above conception of form to the *three determinations* of the virtual as described by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*.[26] Here, the virtual structure is constituted of differential elements having the property of *determinability* (unit = ?), of differential relations between these elements that ensure *reciprocal determination* (unit = x < > unit = y < >…), and of *complete determination* through pre-individual singularities corresponding to singular points in these relations where a qualitative shift occurs. In the sonata paradigm, such singularities become unit = MT, unit = ST (etc.), with corresponding attributes (tonal, formal, functional, hierarchical…).

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26   Cf. note 7 above.

From this quick demonstration, we see that form can be seen as a virtual structure where differential elements, relations and singularities are ready to be explicated into actual musical units. In the Classical style, the sonata form adequately supports (resolves) the functional expression of thematic and tonal hierarchies.[27] But one may ask: what about the actual musical content? Why select *this* tempo, *that* character, *these* melodic profiles? In fact, the formal plan constitutes a level of virtuality that is part of a larger problem, a larger Idea[28]: the *expression* of the work,[29] irrigating thematic units, formal design and every aspect of the music. As Deleuze puts it in *The Movement-Image*, "Montage is the determination of the whole … by means of continuities, cutting and false continuities," it "is the operation which bears on the movement-images to release the whole from them, [the idea], that is, the image *of* time. It is a necessarily indirect image since it is deduced from movement-images and their relationships."[30]

The Idea of the work as a whole represents the larger problematic field of forces that the work actualizes. This is not A. B. Marx's notion of a fully-fledged musical "Idee" that just needs to be written out, as if existing (Platonist-like) 'out there'.[31] The Idea is not a formal plan, a given thematic shape, a harmonic scheme, but all that is expressed by them, it determines the configuration of the actual work.[32] Opposed to hermeneutics, the Idea does not possess extramusical *meaning*, in terms of what it can signify beyond itself (e.g. socially, historically), but rather it is a problem that inheres or subsists within every actual aspect of a work, and is constantly shaped and reshaped along with the unfolding of the form while remaining unexhausted by it. When Arnold Schering states that "the first movement of the Kreutzer Sonata describes … the combat between Tancred and Clorinda from Tasso's 'Gerusalemme liberata',"[33] this amounts to subsuming the actual music under the representation of something else; it tells us little about the inherent forces at play in the music. This is not to say that only one valid answer exists to this question, but rather that we are invited to creatively find ways in which the work can be *problematized*, in order to find not what it represents, but what it actualizes. For instance, in the Kreutzer Sonata, there are many formal irregularities in terms of the thematic structure and consistency of musical flow (as seen above), but also with regards to tonal stability and the formal convention in the context of the classical *accompanied sonata*.[34] The beginning of the slow introduction posits these two issues right at its outset: first, the violin appears as soloist, making it at least equal to the piano, and presents a harmonized melody in A major, incidentally casting the main theme opening basic idea (b.i.) in retrograde (Fig. 5).

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[27]   The problem of form can hardly be detached from style and other social, historical, cultural dimensions – all complex virtualities by themselves and all related to each other, but for the purpose of our discussion our narrower focus will suffice.

[28]   In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze uses interchangeably Idea (capital i), virtual structure and ideal structure; this is the sense that Idea is used here.

[29]   We borrow this phrasing from Deleuze in *Logic of Sense*, where he situates sense as the *expressed* of the linguistic proposition, which is to be distinguished from its signification.

[30]   Deleuze 1997/1983: 29/46 (original emphasis). The *idea* (without capital i), as used in the original text in French, is to be included with the Idea of *Difference and Repetition*. See also: "The idea is not a given structure, fully articulated, that would act as a development program. Nor is the idea equivalent to a plan for organizing the work, for the author cannot know in advance the steps, the operations he will have to go through to unfold or actualize the idea. And if the author cannot know in advance the elements or the steps to be taken to actualize the idea, it is not for lack of knowledge or know-how; it is the problematic nature of the idea that makes it inaccessible to a priori knowledge. An idea is both indeterminate and determinable, and it is repeatedly that it is determined" (Cardinal 2010: 13, our translation).

[31]   Bent 2005/1994: 216: "The composer's imagination tracks this aimless stream of sound [that goes on purposelessly in his mind] for something reflective of his inner world of feeling, and upon finding it engages it, so imbuing it with purpose. This engagement of raw material with the composer's spirit *[Geist]*, this fusion of external with internal, yields the 'Idea' *[Idee]*, which is initially largely subconscious. The process of composition is the 'liberating' of this Idea, it is its disclosure to public gaze. Marx's view clearly comes out of the metaphysical idealism of the Neo-Platonists whereby the artist intuits a vision of ultimate reality, universal Idea, and imitates this reality in art."

[32]   "The Idea of music names a dimension of musical experience that can not be parsed into discrete, identifiable, namable constituents. Idea is pure potential, a multiplicity that is neither one nor many, and a multiplicity … . But to be potential, to have the power to incarnate in the new, Ideas must be differentiated or internally structured." (Hasty 2010: 10).

[33]   Cf. Arnold Schering as cited in a review of his "Beethoven und die Dichtung: mit einer Einleitung zur Geschichte und Ästhetik der Beethovendeutung," in *Music and Letters*, 1937.

[34]   To which the Kreutzer Sonata identifies as "*sonata per il Piano-forte ed un Violino obbligato*".

Figure 5. Kreutzer Sonata, mm. 1–13 of the slow introduction

This melody is immediately repeated in the piano, now in A minor. This leads to a short tonicization of the mediant (C Major, m. 8), and then, and not without suggesting a return to A, the two instruments accelerate their dialogue to finally rejoin on a half-cadence in C, with the MT/b.i. now in the correct order. This segment, along with the MT presentation ending on III (m. 27), shows an inherent major-minor am-bivalence that is expressed by the modal instability of the tonic and a deviating tendency towards the relative major. These two features appear also in the subordinate theme group, where, as shown earlier, the consequent of ST1 is set to E minor, as opposed to E major in the antecedent, and in the suspension on dominant of III that precedes the continuation phase thus starting on a tonicization of the relative major (which will realign as A minor and C in the Recapitulation, just as in MT). The subsequent ST2 continuing in E minor, in turn, emphasizes its submediant, C major, thus recasting this chord now as a counterpart in major mode to E mi-nor. In the Development, ST2 undergoes modal instability by being presented occasionally in major (m. 194) or minor (m. 202). It is worth noting that the minor-major opposition within ST1 comes back in A in the Recapitulation (m. 438), thus insisting on the main key modal ambivalence. A final opposition occurs later in the Coda, in the Adagio interpolation at m. 575, where a unit, made of the compression of the MT first and last basic ideas is first set to major chords (VI, ♭II), melody in the violin, and then to minor chords (iv, i), now in the piano part. At a larger scale, one hears a late response to the opening falling thirds in the violin, in A major, in the piano ascending thirds between mm. 577–581, in minor (cf. fig. 5 and 6).

Figure 6. Kreutzer Sonata, mm. 574–585

Finally, at a larger scale, the second and third movements oppose their respective F and A major to the prevalent A minor of the first.

What forces do these features capture? A possible *interpretation* might suggest the metaphor of "struggling from darkness to light", or of "heroic idealism drawn by pessimist resistance or threatened by tragic fate". However, metaphors only tell us what the music *is not*, or it tells what it is *about,* and only postpones the question of the music's inherent *dramatization*. If the music is to represent an extramusical idea, it first supposes that the idea exists outside of its expression, and second that the music is accessory to its expression. As we have seen earlier, such a Platonist paradigm based upon identity and recognition remains at odds with the virtual. Thus, we should rather ask how can music embody heroism, how can it *be* heroic? What forces does it capture, by its own means making it a genuine exploration of the problem of heroism?[35] Even though this seems better, we still need to problematize the notion of heroism in order to find its inherent intensities: how can music embody forces such as "opposition", "resistance", "struggling", and "impulsivity"?[36] *To struggle* as virtuality constitutes a problematic field not primarily associated with any form or medium of expression, yet it can only exist as implicated in state-of-things, in such a way that it is inseparable from its actualizations, and is fully determined by them. In the Kreutzer, we have already exhibited the tonal and formal *oppositions*, and we could add a force of *impulsivity* in the way the music is interrupted apparently *at will* before resuming in a totally different character (e.g. ST1). *Struggling* may be felt in the way major and minor modes compete with each other, but also in the melodico-rhythmic shape of MT where after an initial falling gesture, a second b.i. finds its way with apparent difficulty, in an ascent back to its starting point (fermata on E above III), and then pushing it further to the tonic, chromatically, one step at a time in whole notes (m. 42). Incidentally, this logic finds its fullest achievement in the Coda when MT returns (m. 533) and expands its ascending phase, turning chromatic departing from C, up to E an octave above the first, thus marking the dramatic climax of the movement as a whole (Fig. 7).

Figure 7. Kreutzer Sonata, mm. 532–547

As such, this climactic point produces a much more powerful effect than that of the conventional "double-return" of the Recapitulation, not only as a goal but also as an expression of the intrinsic forces at play, of the larger Idea. Receding activity follows this expressive summit leading to a complete liquidation of thematic material, ending in a simple A minor arpeggiation (m. 559). Stopping here could have been an option, but Beethoven makes the Idea more complex: first with the Adagio interpolation where the two ends of the main theme are now united without the *struggling* b.i., and second by a conclusive cadential unit that reasserts the Presto character, sustaining the dialogic *opposition* between the instruments until a final unification on tonic harmony. At another level, *opposition* is also to be found in the way the piece *struggles* with the Classical style conventions of sonata form and the *accompanied sonata* model. Indeed, a dialogue appears here in ways more typically found in the Concerto, as opposed to when accompanying instruments are limited to a clearly secondary role (which "obbligato" usually implies).[37] Likewise, a dedication written on an autograph calls

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[35] Just as in *The Time-Image*, when Deleuze critiques the metaphor according to which school is a prison: "… school is a prison, literally, not metaphorically. You do not have the image of a prison following one of a school: that would simply be pointing out a resemblance, a confused relation between two clear images. On the contrary, it is necessary to discover the separate elements and relations that elude us at the heart of an unclear image: to show how and in what sense school is a prison, … – literally, without metaphor" (Deleuze 1997/1985: 20/32). See also: "But if the school is literally a prison, it is because they are both subject to the same relation of forces [*rapport de forces*]. … In what way, according to what forces, is the school a prison?" (Cardinal 2010: 92, our translation).

[36] "Music attempts to render sonorous forces that are not themselves sonorous" (Deleuze 2003/1981: 48).

[37] As reported in Ahn 1997, Chapter 6: in Koch's writings, the Concerto is a designated vehicle for virtuosity, but is also seen as having a stronger expressive potential than the Sonata. Koch further distinguishes between the "concertante" style that implies a tangible sense of dialogue, even competition, as opposed to "obbligato", where the instruments play a more subordinate role.

for attention: a fragment translates into *Mulatto Sonata composed for the mulatto* [violinist, George] *Bridgetower, great madman mulatto composer*.[38] The insistence on the word *mulatto* and its derivatives indicates that Beethoven was aware of the hybrid nature of his work merging aspects of Sonata and Concerto, which is further confirmed by the work's subtitle "*scritta in uno stile molto concertanto, quasi come d'un concerto.*"

The forces at play in the Idea have thus found their way at multiple levels in the piece, from harmonic behaviours and relationships to thematic materials, and formal and genre conventions. Far from being closed, such a multiplicity is open-ended and each new actualization is a further exploration of its potential, and participates in its ever-growing complexity, while at the same time being inseparable from the musical processes it has engaged within each of its singular actualizations.[39]

In conclusion, Deleuze's ontology of the virtual invites us to restore the profoundly creative impetus of musical teleology, notably through a more vitalist[40] appreciation of the relationship between *goal* and *orientedness*, within a more open-ended vision of musical form as a complex of virtual multiplicities that emphasize, at small and larger scales, constant becoming. Form as a problematic field can be explored by problematizing the work under scrutiny, but it should be clear that problematization neither excludes nor denigrates interpretation. A Deleuzian ontology is rather motivated by finding where life lies in its most liberated expression, which happens to be at the level of the pre-individual, where intensive processes are not yet slowed down—if not petrified—into stratified forms. The virtual and later the "body-without-organs", by their differential and intensive nature, are all about informal forces and potentials not yet captured into actualization. It is true that some music overtly embodies this formless imagery, which surely and efficiently fosters a listening experience of the *impersonal* and *pre-individual*, but even a Classical sonata, while very *stratified* as a genre, can be approached from this perspective, and reveal its enveloped intensities, thus recovering an irrepressible and everlasting vibration.

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[38] The evident humoristic and friendly tone of this dedication refers to a violinist called George Bridgetower, of Polish and (presumably) Indian origin and with who Beethoven actually premiered the piece. Originally in Italian: *Sonata mulattica composta per il Mulatto Brischdauer* [sic] *gran pazzo e compositore mulattico* (cf. Ahn 1997: 201–203).

[39] "An idea is therefore the condition at which beings and things gain a problematic nature. But no problematization exhausts the idea …: each problematization only reveals a new aspect of the idea more clearly …; each new concrete problem is a new determination of the idea." (Cardinal 2010: 107, our translation).

[40] "All I have written was vitalist, at least I hope so" (Deleuze 1990: 196, our translation).

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Muzikos forma kaip virtualių probleminių laukų ir procesų aktualizacijos kompleksas: teleologiniai procesai, atsiskleidžiantys Beethoveno „Kreutzerio" sonatoje op. 47 (1803)

Santrauka

Muzika, kaip laike išsiskleidžiantis menas, yra neatsiejama nuo kryptingumo, čia formuojami tikslai ir lūkesčiai nuolat judėti *link kažko* ar tiesiog *pirmyn*. Muzikos teleologijos sąvoka aprėpia tokias aplinkybes, tačiau teleologija, kaip filosofinis konceptas – tarp finalizmo ir mechanizmo, apibūdina *telos* ne tik kaip tikslą, bet ir kaip *raison d'être*, o tai anaiptol nelemia imanentinio dinamiškumo.

Vienoje iš savo knygų „Skirtumas ir pakartojimas" (1968) Deleuze'as kalba apie materialistinę ontologiją, paremtą virtualumo ir aktualumo konceptais. Virtualumas, priešingai nei diktuoja platoniška santykio tarp idėjos ir kopijos samprata, yra toks pat tikras kaip ir jo aktualus atitikmuo, tik suvokiamas kaip transcendentinis (bet visiškai imanentinis). Jis pozicionuojamas kaip ideali diferencialinių elementų ir santykių struktūra, kaip daugialypumas iki individualaus singuliarumo, sudarančio probleminį individuacijos, apimančios dalykų būsenos aktualizaciją, nepanašią į jų sprendžiamas problemas, lauką. *Skirtumas* – tai pagrindinis principas, nuo kurio priklauso visa ši sistema. Tai reiškia, jog intensyvumas, kaip skirtumas, yra perėjimo iš virtualumo į aktualumą veiksnys: visų pirma kaip metafizinė skirtumo virtualume išraiška, o antra, intensyvumas yra pirmas virtualumo aktualizacijos elementas, įgyjantis aktualių materijos ir energijos srautų pavidalą.

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama, kaip ši ontologija gali padėti iš naujo pažvelgti į teleologiją, keliamas klausimas, ar virtualumas ir aktualumas gali būti tarpusavy susiję teleologiniu aspektu ir ar šis santykis gali turėti įtakos mūsų nuostatai dėl muzikos formos. Remdamiesi Deleuze'o požiūriu į Gilbert'o Simondono veikalus, mes pirmą kartą susiduriame su šių idėjų morfogenetinėmis implikacijomis Johnathano Kramerio linearaus laiko sąvokos kontekste. Pasak jo, muzikinį laiką sudaro įvairūs interakcijų tarp linearumo ir nelinearumo lygmenys, o tonali muzika yra „[kryptingo] linearumo išraiškos kvintesencija". Nekryptingas linearumas taip pat suteikia vyksmo pojūtį, bet konkretaus tikslo idėja lieka dviprasmė. Kramerio „kryptingas linearumas" implikuoja baigtinumą, o „nekryptingas linearumas" nulemia mechaninį funkcionavimą. Kita vertus, kai problemos sprendinys nėra nei išankstinis, nei panašus į pačią problemą, virtualumo ir aktualumo logika požiūrį į teleologiją daro gyvybingesnį, kūrybiškesnį, ir jis yra artimas mūsų muzikos formos patyrimui.

Toliau straipsnyje koncentruojantis į muzikos formą kaip virtualių probleminių laukų kompleksą, gilinamasi į *statinę genezę* tarp virtualumo ir aktualumo. „Idealus" sonatos formos modelis gali būti suvoktas kaip virtuali struktūra, kurioje diferencialiniai elementai ir jų santykiai yra paruošti eksplikacijai į aktualius muzikinius elementus. Tik ar tai prisideda prie muzikos kūrinio turinio aktualios *išraiškos*? Tiesą sakant, kūrinio formos planas išreiškia virtualumo lygį, kuris yra didesnės problemos dalis, *iš-reikšta idėja*, „maitinančia" teminius elementus, formos struktūrą ir visus kitus muzikos aspektus. Šios teleologijos perspektyvos iliustruojamos Beethoveno Sonatos smuikui ir fortepijonui Nr. 9, op. 47 (1803), dar žinomos kaip „Kreutzerio" sonata, analize.